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 
Abstract—In this letter a cell with the parallel combination of 
two TiN/Ti/HfO2/W resistive random access memory (RRAM) 
devices is studied for the generation of unpredictable bits. 
Measurements confirm that a simultaneous parallel SET 
operation in which one of the two RRAMs switches to the low 
resistance state (LRS) is an unpredictable process showing 
random properties for different sets of cells. Furthermore, given a 
device pair, the same device switches during subsequent write 
operations. The proposed cell is also analyzed under different 
current compliances and pulse widths with the same persistent 
behavior being observed. The features of the proposed cell, which 
provide data obfuscation without compromising reliability, pave 
the way for its application in Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUFs) for hardware security purposes. 
Index Terms— RRAM, variability, PUF, hardware security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
RRAMs (Resistive Random Access Memories) show 
intercell and cycle-to-cycle variability due to the stochastic 
nature of the switching mechanism, with the corresponding 
impact on their resistance [1]. This variability is one of the 
major limitations for the massive commercialization of these 
devices [2]. Nevertheless, the very same challenge has 
positioned RRAMs as one of the most promising candidates for 
the development of hardware security applications. In fact, 
recent works have explored the use of RRAMs in PUFs 
(Physical Unclonable Functions) [3]-[13]. A hardware PUF 
[14]-[15] is a security primitive that takes advantage of 
manufacturing variations to derive a secret from the physical 
characteristics of integrated circuits (ICs). PUFs are intended 
for device authentication and secret key storage purposes. 
Hence, they must produce uniformly distributed, independent 
and robust random bits. Most existing RRAMs PUFs are based 
on memory arrays with 1T1R (1 transistor – 1 resistor) cells or 
passive crossbars [3]-[13]. Regardless of the structure, a 
common approach to generating random bits (secret) consists 
in first inducing the same resistance state to every RRAM, and 
then performing the sensing procedure. This sensing procedure 
is based on comparing the RRAM resistance against a reference 
or performing a pairwise comparison [3], [5], [8]. This 
approach makes the extraction of the secret difficult for an 
attacker. However, effects such as retention loss, thermal 
dependence of the state or instability during the read process 
may cause bit-flipping during the comparisons, with the 
resulting impact on PUF reliability [16]. Some alternatives 
solve this limitation by setting half of the RRAMs in the high 
resistance state (HRS) and the other half in the low resistance 
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state (LRS) [6]-[7], [10]-[11]. All these approaches may be 
potentially vulnerable since the secret is always unmasked. 
The present letter investigates the behavior of a cell 
composed of two parallel RRAMs for the generation of 
unpredictable bits. In this work we call unpredictable bit a bit 
the value of which may be either 0 or 1 with equal probabilities 
and is determined by an unpredictable event. This event appears 
the first time the two RRAMs are brought in competition, after 
which it becomes repetitive. The idea of competing elements 
for the generation of unpredictable bits has also been proposed 
with AF gates [17]. The association of RRAMs has already 
been exploited for hardware security applications [18]-[21]. In 
fact, the work in [21] proposed a PUF implementation based on 
the parallel configuration of RRAMs, but it was analyzed only 
at simulation level. In this work, we experimentally 
demonstrate the behavior of the parallel association of RRAMs 
for the generation of unpredictable bits. The results, focused at 
cell level, confirm its potential application for PUFs. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP 
The RRAM devices used in the experiments are 
TiN/Ti/HfO2/W structures. The 10nm-thick HfO2 layer was 
deposited by atomic layer deposition (ALD) at 225ºC using 
TDMAH and H2O as precursors, and the top and bottom metal 
electrodes were deposited by magnetron sputtering. The bottom 
electrode consists of a 200nm-W layer and the top electrode of 
a 200nm-TiN and a 10nm-Ti layer acting as oxygen getter 
material. Fig. 1(a) shows a schematic cross-section of the final 
device structure. Fig. 1(b) is a top view microscope image of 
the resulting structures, which are square cells of 60x60 μm2, 
15x15 μm2 and 5x5 μm2. 
The electrical characterization of the devices was performed 
using two synchronized Keysight B2912A Precision 
Source/Measure Units (SMUs). The instruments were 
connected to a computer via GPIB and controlled using 
MATLAB in order to automatically perform successive 
measurements. 
First, the resistive switching behavior of every device was 
assessed under DC conditions. Double-sweep voltage ramps 
were applied from 0 to +1.1 V for the SET operation and from 
0 to -1.4 V for the RESET operation. Typical resistive-
switching characteristics are shown in Fig. 2(a). Voltage pulses 
were then programmed and applied in order to evaluate the 
resistive switching behavior in the pulse mode. The same 
voltage amplitudes as those in DC conditions were used for the 
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switching operations. The corresponding cycling behavior 
under pulse mode for a single device is shown in Fig 2(b). 
Once the proper independent operation of two RRAMs was 
validated, the experiments with the proposed cell were 
performed. Its configuration is depicted in Fig. 3(a), where two 
RRAMs (R1 and R2) are connected in parallel. The common 
bottom electrode (VG) is connected to a grounded resistor (RG). 
The voltage pulse sequences were applied to the top electrodes 
of R1 and R2, as indicated in Fig. 3(b). Note that the SET and 
RESET operations were applied simultaneously to both devices 
and VG is grounded during the RESET operation. No current 
compliance (ICOMP) was applied during the pulse sequences. 
 
Fig. 1: (a) Schematic device cross-section (b) Top view optical 
microscope image. 
 
Fig. 2: (a) DC Resistive switching behavior during successive SET and 
RESET operations (b) RHRS and RLRS resistances during pulsed SET 
and RESET operations for a single RRAM. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The experimental results for a single parallel RRAM cell 
after 150 pulse sequences are shown in Fig. 4. The equivalent 
cell resistances are plotted after every RESET (Fig. 4(a)) and 
SET (Fig. 4(b)), respectively. The behavior of the cell is as 
follows: with both devices initially in the HRS, after the SET 
operation, one of the RRAMs switches to the LRS. When this 
device switches to the LRS, VG increases preventing the other 
device from performing the switch. In the example in Fig. 4, R2 
is the switching device whereas R1 always remains in the HRS. 
However, for a given cell, the RRAM that first switches to the 
LRS is unpredictable and this behavior can be exploited as the 
source of randomness. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
during subsequent RESET operations, only the RRAM in the 
LRS switches, since the other one always remains in the HRS. 
This persistent behavior does not seem to depend on set voltage 
(VSET). As an example of this, Fig. 5(a) shows the values of VSET 
measured during the DC characterization for two RRAMs of a 
given cell. Despite the ranges of VSET were overlapped, R2 was 
always the switching device in the parallel configuration. The 
operation of the proposed cell is also independent of the set-up. 
Fig. 5(b) illustrates the results of the experiment with an RRAM 
pair where the pulse sequences were paused after 125 cycles. 
Connections were then exchanged, so that R1 became R2 and 
vice versa. Subsequently, the experiment was restarted. 
Observe how the switching device is always the same.  
 
Fig. 3: Parallel RRAM cell (a) Schematic and (b) Diagram of voltage 
pulses with VSET = 1.1 V, VRESET = -1.4 V and VREAD = 0.1 V. 
 
Fig. 4: Measured resistances of the RRAMs pair during cycling after 
parallel (a) RESET and (b) SET operations with RG=500Ω. Systematic 
switching is found in a single cell. 
 
Fig. 5: (a) Set voltage VSET obtained for 25 cycles during DC 
characterization for the RRAMs of the same cell. (b) Measured 
resistances of the RRAMs pair during cycling after parallel SET. R1 
and R2 were exchanged in the middle of the experiment. Systematic 
switching for the same device is obtained. 
 
Fig. 6: Average resistance for R1 and R2 after a simultaneous SET 
operation for twelve parallel RRAMs cells, where 250 pulse sequences 
were considered for every cell. R1 and R2 resistances after a SET 
operation are different between cells and cannot be predicted. 
Experiments were performed for a set of 35 RRAMs cells 
and the above behavior was confirmed. In fact, R1 was the 
switching device for 16 out of 35 cells whereas R2 was the 
switching device for the remaining 19 cells. For 12 of these 
cells, 250 pulse sequences were applied to each of them. A 
summary of the obtained results is given in Fig. 6. The reported 
average resistances for R1 and R2 after a simultaneous SET 
indicate that the systematic switching RRAM can be, 
indistinctly, either one of the two devices. 
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Fig. 7: Cumulative probability distributions for the resistances of a 
parallel RRAM cell for different RG values. A sequence of 50 cycles has 
been considered for every RG value (a) R1 after RESET (b) R1 after SET 
(c) R2 after RESET and (d) R2 after SET. 
 
Fig. 8: Resistances of a parallel RRAMs cell after applying a SET 
operation (a) ICOMP swept (b) Pulse width swept. 
 
Fig. 9: Array of parallel RRAMs cells (a) Initially every device is in 
the HRS (b) Unpredictably, one of the two RRAMs of every cell 
switches to the LRS after a SET operation. 
The switching properties of the proposed cell can be 
modified by adjusting the value of the serial resistor RG because 
it acts as a current limiter. In addition, its resistance must be 
appropriately selected to ensure the switching of only one of the 
two RRAMs. If RG is too low, the voltage across the non-
switching RRAM will be high enough to undergo a (partial) 
switching to the LRS during the SET operation. This is shown 
in Fig. 7 where a cell behavior is reported using different RG 
values after every RESET (Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(c)) and SET 
(Fig. 7(b) and Fig. 7(d)). Note that, although the switching 
device is R2, for low RG values (100 Ω and 300 Ω) R1 also 
undergoes a partial switch to a low resistance state (Fig. 7(b)). 
However, this behavior is not observed at higher RG values. 
The proposed cell was also analyzed under different ICOMP 
and pulse widths. The results in Fig. 8(a) show that ICOMP 
controls the resistance difference between both RRAMs after a 
SET operation, without affecting the switching behavior. 
During a parallel SET, as VG increases due to the switching of 
one of the RRAMs, the non-switching RRAM undergoes an 
intermediate voltage during the rest of the pulse. In this context, 
experiments where the pulse width was increased during the 
SET operation were conducted. The results are shown in Fig. 
8(b) without influence of the pulse width in the range evaluated.  
From these results, it is plausible to combine multiple cells 
in an array structure, obtaining a PUF-like implementation, as 
shown in Fig. 9(a). A single SET operation is initially required 
at every cell of the array to unmask the set of unpredictable bits 
(secret), see Fig. 9(b). No more write operations are required 
and only read operations need to be applied to sense the secret. 
The read process may consist in sensing the voltage at the 
common electrode when a read voltage is applied to the top 
electrode of either one of the RRAMs, with the top electrode of 
the other device grounded. Note that this voltage must be higher 
than the read voltage applied for a single RRAM. However, 
security may be compromised if an attacker tries to extract the 
secret while it is unmasked. This threat can be minimized if we 
take advantage of the persistent switching behavior during 
sequential operations. As soon as the secret stops being used, 
the cell can be obfuscated by applying a RESET operation, thus 
forcing both devices to the HRS. Hence, the measurement of 
the RRAMs resistances will not leak the stored bits, even if the 
circuit is powered off. In addition, subsequent SET operations 
will unmask the bits when needed. A PUF-like implementation 
based on the proposed cell is not expected to be susceptible to 
reliability issues caused by read instability, retention loss or 
thermal dependence, since the two RRAMs in a given cell are 
in different resistance states during the read-out. As in many 
PUF implementations, cells with unstable behavior may appear, 
inducing errors. This issue is addressed by incorporating error-
correcting techniques or an allowable error threshold [15]. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the first time, it was experimentally shown that two 
parallel RRAMs can be exploited as a basic cell for the 
generation of unpredictable bits. The simultaneous SET of two 
parallel RRAMs triggers a stochastic switch of one of the 
devices. The switching of one of the RRAMs between high and 
low resistance states persists during subsequent SET and 
RESET operations whereas the other RRAM always remains in 
a high resistance state. The observed behavior allows data 
obfuscation without compromising reliability. These features 
make this cell appealing for hardware security applications. In 
fact, the combination of multiple cells could be leveraged for 
potential implementation of a PUF-like structure. 
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